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Abstract
Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols represent an important cryptographic mechanism that enables
several parties to communicate securely over an open network. Elashry, Mu and Susilo proposed an Identity
Based Authenticated Key Exchange (IBAKE) protocol where different parties establish secure communication
by means of their public identities.The authors also introduced a new security notion for IBAKE protocols
called resiliency, that is, if the secret shared key is compromised, the entities can generate another shared secret
key without establishing a new session between them. They then claimed that their IBAKE protocol satisfies
this security notion.
We analyze the security of their protocol and prove that it has a major security flaw which renders it insecure
against an impersonation attack. We also disprove the resiliency property of their scheme by proposing an
attack where an adversary can compute any share secret key if just one secret bit is leaked.
1. INTRODUCTION
Key agreement protocols permit different parties to share a common secret key which in turn can
be used for different cryptographic goals like communication encryption, data integrity, etc. The
first practical solution to the problem of key-distribution is the famous Diffie-Hellman protocol [6].
However, it does not prevent from Man-In-The-Middle attacks because it does not authenticate the
involved parties. A key agreement protocol provides key authentication if each entity involved in the
exchange is assured that no other entity can learn the shared secret key. There exist several methods to
broadcast authenticated keys. Classically it requires public-key certificates with public key infrastruc-
tures. Another very interesting approach is to use public data like identities to generate authenticated
keys.
The idea of using identities in cryptography dates back to Shamir’s paper [14] where he asks how
to achieve a public key encryption scheme that allows to compute public keys from arbitrary strings
like user’s identity (an email, phone number, etc). Consequently, electronic certificates are no more
required and more importantly it eliminates the need for large-scale public key infrastructure. Al-
though Shamir introduced in [14] the concept of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE), he was not able to
propose one. The construction remained an open problem until Boneh and Franklin [2] and Cocks [4]
proposed IBE schemes in 2001. The Boneh-Franklin scheme [2] makes use of bilinear maps which
then sparked a lot of works [1, 18]. Recently, lattices have also been used in the design of IBE schemes
[8] which gave rise to a large number of schemes.
Cocks builds in [4] an IBE scheme based on the quadratic residuosity problem modulo an RSA
integer. It is time-efficient compared with pairing-based IBE systems, but unfortunately ciphertexts are
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very long. Boneh, Gentry and Hamburg (BGH) solved the problem of Cocks’ scheme by presenting a
space-efficient scheme without pairings but at the cost of a less time-efficient scheme [3].
The concept of IBE was extended to authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols. Smart [15]
presented a two-pass Identity-Based AKE (IBAKE) using Weil pairings and merging the ideas of
Boneh and Franklin [2] with tripartite Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol of Joux [10]. This work was
then followed by several works. Recently, Elashry, Mu and Susilo [7] proposed another IBAKE
protocol and introduced a new security notion called resiliency. A key exchange protocol is said to be
resilient when parties are able to generate new shared secret keys without establishing a new session
between them, even if a secret shared key has been compromised. The IBAKE protocol proposed by
[7] builds upon the IBE encryption scheme of [3] and it is claimed in [7] to be resilient.
1.1. Our contribution. In this paper, we analyze the security of Elashry, Mu and Sussilo (EMS) pro-
tocol [7] and prove that it has a major security flaw which renders it insecure against an impersonation
attack. We are indeed able to prove that the protocol is insecure against a very simple man-in-the-
middle attack.
We also disprove the resiliency property of the EMS scheme by proposing an attack where an
adversary can compute in time quartic in the security parameter the secret shared key from the knowl-
edge of a single secret bit. Our method is similar to the one given in [16] to attack an IBE encryption
scheme proposed in [9].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the definition and notion
for IBAKE protocols. In Section 3, we present Elashry, Mu, Sussilo (EMS) IBAKE protocol [7].
In Section 4, we describe our attacks against this protocol. In Section 5, we discuss the question of
repairing the scheme. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude the paper.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1. IBAKE Protocol. We shall assume that a trusted authority is responsible for the creation and
distribution of users’ private keys. An Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange protocol (IBAKE)
[15, 13] is defined by three algorithms: Setup(), Extract() and KeyExchange().
(1) (msk,mpk)← Setup(λ). The authority takes as input a security parameter λ and generates
public parameters that are denoted by mpk and a master secret key msk.
(2) skid ← Extract(msk, id). Given an identity id, the authority uses his master key msk to
generate the private key skid corresponding to id.
(3) ssk ← KeyExchange(id1, id2). Two parties P1 and P2 with system parameters (id1, skid1)
and (id2, skid2) respectively generate a shared secret key ssk.
2.2. Quadratic Residues and Jacobi Symbol. For any integer N > 2 we denote by Z×N the multi-
plicative group of integers modulo N . Let y ∈ Z×N then we say that y is a quadratic residue in Z×N if
there exists x ∈ Z×N such that:
y ≡ x2 mod N.
The set of quadratic residues in Z×N is denoted by QR(N):
QR(N) =
{
y ∈ Z×N : ∃x ∈ Z×N , y = x2 mod N
}
.
Let p be an odd prime number, we define the Legendre symbol of x ∈ Z with respect to p as(
x
p
)
= x
p−1
2 mod p.
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We recall that
(
x
p
)
belongs to {−1, 0, 1} and enables to determine if x is a quadratic residue since
we have: (
x
p
)
=
 1 if x ∈ QR(N)−1 if x /∈ QR(N) and x 6= 0 mod p
0 if x = 0 mod p.
The Legendre symbol is extended to any odd positive integer N = pα11 · · · pαkk where p1, . . . , pk are
pairwise different prime numbers and α1, . . . , αk are positive integers. This generalization is called
the Jacobi symbol and is defined as:( x
N
)
=
(
x
p1
)α1
· · ·
(
x
pk
)αk
.
The subset of ZN with symbol to equal 1 is denoted by J(N). Note that QR(N) is a subset of J(N).
The quadratic residuosity assumption states that, for any integer N = pq, where p and q are
different prime numbers that are picked at random, there exists no probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm that is able to distinguish between the distribution of samples drawn from QR(N) and the
distribution of samples picked from J(N) \QR(N) (see [3] for more details).
2.3. Solving Rx2 + Sy2 = 1 mod N . Assuming that N = pq where p and q are different prime
numbers, Boneh, Gentry and Hamburg presented in [3] an efficient algorithm to solve in ZN an
equation of the form:
Rx2 + Sy2 = 1 mod N (1)
where R and S are in ZN . They considered the following ternary quadratic form over Z:
R˜x2 + S˜y2 − z2 = 0. (2)
with R˜, S˜ in Z. A classical result of Legendre [3] says that (2) has a solution (x, y, z) ∈ Z3 if there
exist r˜ and s˜ in Z such that
R˜ = r˜2 mod S˜ and S˜ = s˜2 mod R˜. (3)
Cremona and Rusin proposed in [5] an algorithm using lattice reduction to solve (2) assuming that (3)
holds. Furthermore, if R˜ = R mod N and S˜ = S mod N then a solution to (2) also gives a solution
to (1). Consequently, solving (1) consists in finding prime numbers R˜, S˜ and integers r˜, s˜ such that
R˜ = R mod N , S˜ = S mod N and r˜, s˜ satisfy (3). There exist several possible candidates
(R˜, S˜) from a given couple (R,S) but Boneh and Franklin proposed a deterministic polynomial-time
algorithm that finds a specific (R˜, S˜) which leads to a solution to (1). For more details we refer the
reader to [3].
Finally we state an important lemma that shows an important property used in [3] and [7].
Lemma 1. Assume that R and S belong to QR(N) and let (x, y) be a solution to (1). Then we have
the following equality: (
1 + x
√
R
N
)
=
(
2 + 2y
√
S
N
)
.
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Proof. We have in ZN the following equality:(
x
√
R+ 1
)(
2y
√
S + 2
)
= 2xy
√
RS + 2x
√
R+ 2y
√
S + 2
=
(
x
√
R+ y
√
S + 1
)2
.
The last equality is obtained by using (1). 
3. ELASHRY-MU-SUSILO (EMS) IBAKE SCHEME
EMS scheme [7] is specified by the following algorithms (Fig. 1):
(1) (msk,mpk) ← Setup(λ). The authority generates two prime numbers p and q according
to security parameter λ. It also picks µ ∈ J(N) \ QR(N) and chooses a hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ −→ J(N). The master public key is then mpk = {N,µ,H} where N = pq and
the master secret key is msk = (p, q).
(2) skid ← Extract(msk, id). Given an identity id, the authority generates R = H(id). Since
R is in J(N) then either R or µR belongs to QR(N). The authority chooses a in {0, 1} such
that µaR belongs to QR(N). It then picks at random one of the four possible square roots of
µaR. We denote it by
√
µaR. The private key for identity id is then skid = (a,
√
µaR).
(3) ssk ← KeyExchange(id1, id2). Party P1 with identity id1 and system parameter R1 =
H(id1), skid1 chooses two random values s1 and α1 in Z×N such that1
µα1R1 ∈ QR(N).
P1 then sends (id1, µα1 , S1) to P2 where S1 = s21 mod N and keeps secret (α1, s1). P2 with
identity id2 and system parameter R2 = H(id1), skid2 also performs the same procedure by
choosing two random values s2 and α2 in Z×N such that
µα2R2 ∈ QR(N).
Then P2 sends (id2, µα2 , S2) to P1 with S2 = s22 mod N , and keeps secret (α2, s2).
Each party P1 and P2 solves independently for each i = 1, . . . , ` the equation:
µα1R1S
2i+1
1 x
2
i + µ
α2R2S
2i+1
2 y
2
i = 1 mod N. (4)
From the solution (xi, yi) and its private key P1 is then able to compute the quantity ki,1 ∈
{−1, 1} where
ki,1 =
(
1 + xis
2i+1
1
√
µα1R1
N
)
.
P2 computes ki,2 ∈ {−1, 1} from the solution (xi, yi) and its private as the following:
ki,2 =
(
2 + 2yis
2i+1
2
√
µα2R2
N
)
.
By Lemma 1 we know that ki,1 = ki,2 and therefore the shared secret key ssk is(
k1,1, k1,1, . . . , k`,1
)
=
(
k1,2, k1,2, . . . , k`,2
)
= ssk.
1P1 can easily find α1 ∈ Z such that µα1R1 ∈ QR and can even compute √µα1R1 from its private key skid1 =
(a1,
√
µa1R1). Indeed, P1 chooses α1 to be equal to 2t+ a1 for a random integer t ∈ Z so that
µα1R1 = µ
2t+a1R1 =
(
µt
√
µaR1
)2
.
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FIGURE 1. Elashry-Mu-Susilo (EMS) IBAKE protocol.
4. CRYPTANALYSIS
4.1. Impersonation Attack. The EMS protocol displays from its definition a major security flaw: it
does not prevent from parties to be impersonated by an adversary. The protocols does not ensure any
authentication during the exchange. In the following we explain a simple man-in-the-middle attack.
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FIGURE 2. Impersonation attack.
Let us assume that an adversary A receives and forwards data exchanged between P1 and P2 whose
parameters are respectively (R1 = H(id1), skid1) and (R2 = H(id2), skid2). We will now show how
A can easily impersonate P1.
When P1 sends its session identifier (id1, µα1 , S1) to P2, A intercepts it and chooses randomly t
and s in Z×N , computes S = s
2 mod N then sends to P2 the quantity
(
id1,
t2
R1
, S
)
. P2 also sends
its session identifier (id2, µα2 , S2) that is intercepted byA. Upon receiving (id1, t2R1 , S), P2 computes
first T = t
2
R1
R1 mod N which turns out to be t2 mod N . Therefore A and P2 have both to solve
for i = 1, . . . , ` the (common) equations:
TS2i+1x2 + µα2R2S
2i+1
2 y
2 = 1 mod N.
Then A and P2 share the same secret key ssk = (k1, . . . , k`) since for any i > 1:
ki =
(
1 + xits
2i+1
N
)
=
(
2 + 2yi
√
µα2R2s
2i+1
2
N
)
.
The main reason why this attack is possible comes from the fact that each party in the protocol
perform computations without involving data that identify the correspondent. Hence EMS protocol
does not satisfy the basic property of authentication that any AKE protocol must satisfy. In the next
section, we analyze further the security of the protocol by showing that EMS does not even ensure the
resiliency property [7].
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4.2. Attack Against the Resiliency Property. We assume that two parties P1 and P2 managed to
share a secret key ssk = (k1, . . . , k`) by means of EMS protocol as described in Section 3. We will
prove that if an attacker A only knows one bit, let us say ki with i ∈ {1, . . . , `}, then A is able
to recompute any bit kj with j 6= i. This proves that EMS protocol does not satisfy the resiliency
property unlike what is claimed by the authors in [7]. But before presenting our attack, we need an
important lemma.
Lemma 2. [3, Lemma 5.1] LetA,B1 andB2 be elements from ZN , and for each i in {1, 2} let (xi, yi)
be a solution to
Ax2 +Biy
2 = 1 mod N.
If Ax1x2 + 1 belongs to Z×N then (x3, y3) with x3 =
x1+x2
1+Ax1x2
and y3 =
y1y2
1+Ax1x2
is solution to
Ax2 +B1B2y
2 = 1 mod N.
We now describe how an adversary A can break the EMS protocol if A only knows ki for some
i ∈ {1, . . . , `} from a shared key (k1, . . . , k`). For the sake of simplicity, we will only describe how
A can recover ki+1 from ki and data publicly exchanged by P1 and P2. By induction, the attack can
be generalized to any bit kj .
Firstly, A solves (4) for i and i+ 1 to get (xi, yi) and (xi+1, yi+1) such that: µ
α1R1S
2i+1
1 x
2
i + µ
α2R2S
2i+1
2 y
2
i = 1 mod N
µα1R1S
2i+3
1 x
2
i+1 + µ
α2R2S
2i+3
2 y
2
i+1 = 1 mod N.
As explained in Section 2.3, A gets the same solutions to these equations as P1 and P2 would have
during the protocol. Furthermore, A knows (S1xi+1, yi+1) which is a solution to the following equa-
tion:
µα1R1S
2i+1
1 (S1xi+1)
2 + µα2R2S
2i+3
2 y
2
i+1 = 1 mod N.
From solutions (xi, yi) and (S1xi+1, yi+1), the adversary A, by using Lemma 2, derives (x∗, y∗) that
is solution to the equation
µα1R1S
2i+1
1 x
2
∗ + µ
α2R22S
4i+4
2 y
2
∗ = 1 mod N (5)
where
x∗ =
xi + S1xi+1
1 + µα1R1S
2i+2
1 xixi+1
and y∗ =
yiyi+1
1 + µα1R1S
2i+2
1 xixi+1
.
The next lemma proves that ki and ki+1 are related and an adversary can easily compute ki+1 from
ki and y∗ and the public data exchanged between P1 and P2.
Lemma 3. Let (x∗, y∗) be the solution to (5). We then have the equality:
ki+1 = ki ·
(
1 + µα1R1S
2i+2
1 xixi+1
N
)
·
(
2 + 2y∗µα2R2S2i+22
N
)
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Proof. We start by observing that
1 + x∗
√
µα1R1S
2i+1
1 = 1 + x∗
√
µα1R1s
2i+1
1
= 1 +
(xi + S1xi+1)
1 + µα1R1S
2i+2
1 xixi+1
√
µα1R1s
2i+1
1
=
1 + µα1R1S
2i+2
1 xixi+1 + xi
√
µα1R1s
2i+1
1 + xi+1
√
µα1R1s
2i+3
1
1 + µα1R1S
2i+2
1 xixi+1
=
(
1 + xi
√
µα1R1s
2i+1
1
) (
1 + xi+1
√
µα1R1s
2i+3
1
)
1 + µα1R1S
2i+2
1 xixi+1
Since ki =
(
1+xi
√
µα1R1s
2i+1
1
N
)
and ki+1 =
(
1+xi+1
√
µα1R1s
2i+3
1
N
)
, this implies in particular that:
ki+1 = ki ·
(
1 + µα1R1S
2i+2
1 xixi+1
N
)
·
1 + x∗
√
µα1R1S
2i+1
1
N

Since (x∗, y∗) is solution to (5) and µα1R1S2i+11 ∈ QR(N) then by Lemma 1 we also have that:
(
2 + 2y∗µα2R2S2i+22
N
)
=
1 + x∗
√
µα1R1S
2i+1
1
N

which terminates the proof of the lemma. 
This attack is as efficient as the scheme since it only requires to compute the Jacobi symbol and the
solving of (1). The computation of the Jacobi symbol can be performed [17] in O (logNM (logN))
operations where M(λ) is the cost of the multiplication of two integers of size λ bits (for large integers
M(λ) = λ log λ log log λ). The equation (1) can be solved withO
(
log4N
)
operations ([3]). The total
cost of the attack is therefore O
(
log4N
)
operations.
5. DISCUSSION ON A REPARATION
Our work raises also the question of whether the EMS protocol can be repaired. Our attack exploits
the fact that the shared secret bits are related (see Lemma 3). One possible reparation would be
to generate ` independent identity values Ri,1, . . . , Ri,` for a party Pi. For instance, one solution
is to set Rj = H(id, j) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , `}, and the authority creates the secret key as sk =
((aj)16j6`, (rj)16j6`) with rj =
√
µajRj . Next, when two parties P1 and P2 wish to authenticate,
they just have to solve the equations:
R1,ix
2
i,j +R2,jy
2
i,j = 1 mod N. (6)
The secret shared bit associated to this equation is now ki,j =
(
1+xi,j
√
R1,i
N
)
=
(
2+2yi,j
√
R2,j
N
)
.
Hence, they do not require anymore the values µα1 and µα2 which introduced the weaknesses (in
particular for the impersonation attack). Unfortunately, this new protocol can (only) produce `2 secret
bits, and the secret and public keys becomes ` times larger, which leads to an inefficient protocol for
realistic applications.
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6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the security of the IBAKE protocol in introduced in [7]. The authors
claimed that their protocol is provably secure when during the key exchange session some secret bits
are leaked.
We showed that this protocol has two major weaknesses. First, it is vulnerable to a simple man-in-
the-middle attack. Secondly, we propose an efficient attack where an adversary can easily compute
any bit of a shared key if just one secret bit is known, which contradicts authors’ claim.
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